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Second Chance For Ex-Partner’s Parenting Claim
Manhattan appeals court open to argument regarding adoption after a breakup
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

I

n just the latest in a series of cases dating back more than a quarter century
grappling with questions about parental
standing within unmarried same-sex
couples, a New York State appellate court has
revived a lawsuit by Kelly Gunn, who is seeking
joint custody of a child adopted by her former
partner, Circe Hamilton.
On June 26, a five-judge panel of the Appellate Division’s Manhattan-based First Department reversed an April dismissal of the case
by Supreme Court Justice Frank Nervo, who
had found that that despite her close relationship with the child, Gunn was not a “parent”
under New York’s Domestic Relations Law and
so lacked “standing” to sue for custody or visitation.
The unanimous appellate panel, in an opinion by Justice Judith J. Gische, found that
Gunn should have another chance to call on
the court’s “equitable powers” to recognize her
relationship with the child.
Some background on New York courts’ treatment of same-sex parent issues is in order. In
1991, the state’s highest bench, the Court of Appeals, in Alison D. v. Virginia M., established
an unfortunate precedent that only a person
related to the child by blood or adoption has
standing to seek custody or court-ordered visitation. In the years that followed, the New York
courts repeatedly confronted cases of same-sex
couples raising a child together but then breaking up, with the birth or adoptive parent resisting their former partner’s attempt to continue
in a parental role. The former partners in those
cases found no relief from the state’s courts.
In her dissent in that case, then-Chief Judge
Judith Kaye argued the decision failed to take
account of the reality of non-traditional families, including those headed by LGBTQ couples,
and would ultimately be harmful to the best interests of the children.
That shortcoming in addressing same-sex
parenting issues was finally addressed by the
Court of Appeals in August 2016, in its decision in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C. C, where
it focused on a written agreement between two
women who had a child through donor insemination and shared parenting responsibilities
until the couple split up. There, the high court
determined that the second parent should have
standing to seek custody or visitation so the
court could make a determination based on the
child’s best interests.
The court’s opinion in Brooke S.B., written by
the late Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam, was narrow and cautious, tailored to the facts of that
case, and leaving open what other theories secGayCityNews.nyc | July 5 – July 18, 2018
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ond parents could pursue to have their standing recognized.
In one case decided shortly after Brooke S.B.,
the court accepted what is called a “judicial estoppel” theory, because the birth mother had
originally sued her former partner for child support, alleging she had a parental obligation, but
later sought to deny the other woman standing to assert parental rights. The birth mother
was not allowed to take those two inconsistent
positions. In that case, the two women had not
made a formal written agreement, but the former partner’s standing was recognized.
Gunn and Hamilton, together beginning in
2004, agreed in 2007 to pursue an international adoption and raise a child together as
a family. The plan was for Hamilton to adopt
overseas and bring the child home to New York,
and that Gunn would then complete a “second
parent” adoption. The women’s romantic relationship ended in December 2009, before any
adoption had taken place. The following year,
Gunn and Hamilton, with the assistance of
lawyers, signed a separation agreement dividing up their assets.
Despite this breakup, the women remained
friends, and Hamilton continued to pursue an
adoption, with Gunn’s encouragement. In the
summer of 2011, Hamilton adopted a child, and
Gunn, in Europe on business, met Hamilton
and the child in London and the three returned
to New York together.
Hamilton allowed Gunn frequent contact
with the child, with whom Gunn formed an attachment. In August 2016, just as the Court of
Appeals was overruling the Alison D. decision
in the Brooke S.B. case, Hamilton, a British native, announced she was moving back to Eng-

land with the child. Gunn quickly sprang into
action, filing her lawsuit and seeking a temporary order requiring Hamilton to remain in New
York with the child while the case was litigated.
Gunn claimed that under Brooke S.B., she had
standing to seek joint custody and visitation
rights based on the women’s 2007 agreement.
Justice Nervo did not dismiss the case outright and there was a temporary order placed
on Hamilton, but after a lengthy trial — during which he reviewed the extensive record of
communications between the two women in
the period immediately preceding the adoption
— he determined that the 2007 agreement had
not survived their breakup. By the time Hamilton adopted the child, he found, she was acting
on her own. Nervo concluded that Gunn was a
friend who had formed an attachment with the
child, but not a “parent” within the meaning of
the Domestic Relations Law.
The decision proved controversial from the
moment it was announced, particularly in
light of the judicial estoppel finding the Court
of Appeals made in the post-Brooke S.B. case
discussed above. Even in the absence of an express agreement, a court could recognize parental standing, according to the state’s highest bench. Gunn argued that this was such a
case.
Writing for the Appellate Division, Judge
Gische found that this may be the kind of case
where equitable estoppel — based on whether
Gunn had assumed a sufficiently parental role
toward the child, with the consent or at least acquiescence of Hamilton — is appropriate. While
agreeing with Nervo that the couple’s breakup
meant the case did not come squarely within
the holding of Brooke S.B., the appellate panel
found that both sides should have the opportunity to present evidence about whether equitable estoppel applies here.
Should Nervo conclude that Gunn has standing to sue using an equitable estoppel theory,
he would then have to consider the child’s best
interests. A “guardian ad litem” could be appointed to represent the child’s interests.
Gunn asked to have the case assigned to a
different judge, but the Appellate Division declined to do so, without explanation.
Gunn is represented by Robbie Kaplan and
her law firm, Kaplan & Company, as well as lawyers from Morrison Cohen and Chemtob Moss
& Forman. Hamilton is represented by lawyers from Cohen Rabin Stine Schumann. The
LGBT Law Association Foundation of Greater
New York submitted an amicus brief to the
court, with pro bono assistance from Latham &
Watkins, not taking sides between the parties
but discussing possible routes for applying the
Brooke S.B. case to this new situation
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